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Summary
In this article, we assess the impact of ﬁnancial incentives on the inﬂow in the public Disabil-
ity Insurance (DI) scheme in The Netherlands. For this matter, the variation in replacement rates
over different sectors is exploited to estimate the probability of DI enrolment over a sample of
employees from the Dutch Income Panel (1996–2000). On the basis of these administrative data,
we ﬁnd a point estimate of the elasticity of DI enrolment with respect to the DI wealth rate of
2.5. Simulations indicate that a 5%-point rise in replacement rates in the two ﬁrst years of DI
increases DI enrolment by 6%.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In The Netherlands, as well as in many other western countries, the num-
ber of participants in public Disability Insurance (DI) schemes has been
growing over the past three decades, which has led to high expenditures on
such schemes and a downward pressure on labour force participation. Com-
pared to other countries, the use of DI in The Netherlands is relatively
high. In 1999 the number of DI enrolments was 10.4 per 1000 insured work-
ers, whereas enrolment in Germany and US equalled 5.3 and 6.0, respec-
tively. In that same year, public expenditures on DI beneﬁts equalled 2.7% of
GDP in The Netherlands, while for Germany and US expenditures equalled
1.0% and 0.7%, respectively.1 Several possible explanations may exist for this
difference. Unlike most other countries, DI in The Netherlands does not
distinguish between occupational and social risks, and every worker is fully
insured irrespective of his or her work history. Another difference is that dis-
ability is insured from a minimum of 15% of so-called ‘earnings capacity’,
implying that any worker who loses at least 15% of his/her earnings due to
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1 These ﬁgures are drawn from OECD (2003). DI beneﬁts are excluding sickness beneﬁts,
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disability will be covered by DI. A fourth reason may be the relatively attrac-
tive ﬁnancial conditions in The Netherlands (OECD (2003)). The inﬂuence
of these ﬁnancial conditions on DI enrolment is precisely the topic of this
article.
Disability Insurance schemes are meant to provide insurance against the
risk of earnings loss due to disability. The growth in DI use can however
not be explained by an increase of disability within the population (see, e.g.
Aarts and de Jong (1992)). Due to informational problems and imperfect dis-
ability evaluation, able people may receive DI beneﬁts instead of working
more hours, or receive DI beneﬁts instead of unemployment beneﬁts, early
retirement beneﬁts, or welfare. Such improper use may help explaining the
expansion of DI use in The Netherlands. Both employers and employees have
experienced incentives to make use of DI in an improper way. Employers have
often considered DI schemes as a decent way to get rid of workers with low-
productivity compared to their wages, in particular older workers. Moreover,
the burden of DI beneﬁts was not directly borne by the employers.2 On the
other hand, the relatively generous DI beneﬁts have attracted both persons
who would otherwise have worked more hours and persons who would have
been on early retirement beneﬁts, unemployment beneﬁts, or welfare. In par-
ticular, DI is considered to be an important alternative to the ‘ofﬁcial’ early
retirement schemes (Woittiez et al. (1994); Lindeboom (1998); Kerkhofs et al.
(1999)). This is further encouraged by the fact that workers experience high-
implicit taxes on continued work, as DI beneﬁts are not subject to any actu-
arial adjustments (Kapteyn and de Vos (1999)).
A number of empirical studies have conﬁrmed the relationship between
the number of participants in DI schemes and the local economic situa-
tion. Among the ﬁrst studies for The Netherlands were Van den Bosch and
Petersen (1983) and Roodenburg and Wong Meeuw Hing (1985), who both
conclude that the stock of DI-beneﬁciaries in the 1970s contained hidden
unemployment. Based on the ratings of insurance physicians and ergonomists,
Aarts and de Jong (1992) have estimated the extent to which DI-beneﬁciaries
are able to work, and arrive at an implied structural share of hidden unem-
ployment within the 1980 DI inﬂow of 33–51%. Estimates of Westerhout
(1996) suggest that almost 50% of all participants in DI schemes in The
Netherlands in the period 1973–1992 was in fact hidden unemployment. For
later years (1988 and 1990), Hassink et al. (1997) ﬁnd a hidden unemploy-
ment rate in DI inﬂow of about 10%.3 Moreover, Hassink (1996, 2000) ﬁnds
that about a quarter of the employees enrolling into DI are not replaced by
2 Note that this has changed since 1998, when experience rating was introduced in DI
employer premiums. See Koning (2004) for an evaluation of this policy measure.
3 In 1987, a reform of DI took place (this will be discussed in section 2), so that the study of
Westerhout (1996) mainly concerns the period before this reform, while the study of Hassink
et al. (1997) exclusively deals with years after the reform.
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new workers, that is the concerning jobs are destroyed. For other countries,
such as the US, there is an abundance of literature showing that the local DI
schemes contain hidden unemployment (see, e.g. Autor and Duggan (2002),
Black et al. (2002)).
In an interesting study of Canadian DI, Gruber (2000) makes use of a pol-
icy change speciﬁc to the Quebec province to estimate the elasticity of labour
supply of older persons with respect to DI beneﬁts. His results imply point
estimates of the elasticity of labour force non-participation with respect to
DI beneﬁts in the range 0.28–0.36. Given the fact that within his dataset the
disabled constitute about one ﬁfth of all non-participants, the elasticity of
the probability of receiving DI beneﬁts with respect to these beneﬁts would
equal about 1.6. This ﬁgure is actually even on the conservative side when
it is thought that substitution within the category of non-participants is not
taken into account, and that Gruber in fact identiﬁes the short term elastic-
ity (Bound and Burkhauser (1999)). For The Netherlands, there is not much
empirical evidence on the effect of ﬁnancial incentives on DI enrolment. Aarts
and de Jong (1992) estimate the probability of DI enrolment on a sample of
individuals with sickness beneﬁts, and ﬁnd that a reduction in the replace-
ment rate with 16% reduces the conditional DI enrolment probability by 54%,
which implies a beneﬁt elasticity of 3.5.
This study focuses on the determinants of DI enrolment with a particular
focus on the effect of ﬁnancial incentives. By using a rich micro dataset and
sector speciﬁc collective labour agreements, we try to identify the elasticity
of DI enrolment with respect to DI beneﬁts. As a result of (sector- or ﬁrm-
speciﬁc) collective labour agreements, beneﬁts are usually higher than statu-
tory beneﬁts, and differ for individuals working in different sectors and ﬁrms.
Therefore, the ﬁnancial attractiveness of DI schemes differs between different
sectors and ﬁrms. We exploit this variation in DI beneﬁt levels to identify the
effect of ﬁnancial incentives on DI enrolment. Obviously, a special effort has
been made to correct for unobserved sector- and ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects, so that
the estimated elasticity will suffer the least possible from bias due to omitted
variables.
This article is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the Dutch DI
system, its history and its position among other forms of social security.
Section 3 discusses the DI determination process, the determinants of DI en-
rolment, and the behaviour of individuals and program administrators mak-
ing the beneﬁt award decisions. In section 4, the data are described, while in
section 5 our empirical strategy is discussed. Estimation results are presented
in section 6. Finally, concluding remarks and recommendations are given in
section 7.
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2 INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
2.1 A Brief History
The current Dutch DI system (WAO) was originally introduced in 1967, and
was meant to provide insurance against the risk of earnings loss due to dis-
ability. During 1970s, the annual growth rate of DI recipients was about 11%,
which was much higher than expected at the introduction of the system. Pro-
gramme expenditures grew even faster, so that corrective policy measures were
needed to alleviate the ﬁnancial burden. During the 1980s various actions
were taken, with major adjustments becoming active in 1985 and 1987. Main
features of the reforms were the reduction of the replacement rate from 80 to
70%, introduction of a more equal treatment of men and women, and discon-
nection of the disability and unemployment component in the DI programme
by removing labour market considerations from disability assessment. In that
same year, Unemployment Insurance (UI) was reformed as well, most nota-
bly by the introduction of work experience as a criterion for unemployment
beneﬁt duration.
However, in the early 1990s it became clear that these adjustments did
not lead to the expected volume and cost reducing effects. Thus, the second
phase of reforms started. More ﬁnancial incentives were introduced to con-
front both employees and employers with the ﬁnancial consequences of the
excessive use of sickness and disability beneﬁts. In 1992, a premium differ-
entiation system for sickness beneﬁts and a (not long-lived) no-claim bonus
system were introduced (TAV). The system implied that employers had to
pay a penalty for each one of their employees entering the DI rolls. On the
other hand, a ﬁrm employing a DI beneﬁciary for at least one year received
a bonus.
Until 1993, a fully disabled beneﬁciary received a wage-related beneﬁt
(70%) of unlimited duration. Since 1993, both the duration of the wage-
related beneﬁt and the level of the beneﬁt have depended on the recipient’s
age and employment history at the moment of DI enrolment. Depending on
the age and work history, a fully disabled beneﬁciary receives a wage-related
beneﬁt (70%) for at most 6 years. During the subsequent period, a fully dis-
abled beneﬁciary has received a base amount of 70% of the minimum wage
plus a supplement depending on age. Partially disabled receive pro rata ben-
eﬁts. However, the difference between the new and old replacement rates has
been repaired in practice for about 80% of the employees through collective
labour agreements made by the social partners (Social and Economic Council
of The Netherlands (2002)). This will be further discussed in section 4.1.
A restricted own risk for employers for sickness beneﬁts was introduced
in 1994 (TZ) in order to reduce absence through illness. Large ﬁrms became
responsible for the continued payment of wages during the ﬁrst six weeks
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of sickness, and small ﬁrms for the ﬁrst two weeks. Since 1996 employers
must pay sickness beneﬁts during the entire ﬁrst year (WULBZ). The no-
claim bonus system introduced in 1992 was lifted again in 1995 and replaced
by a system of experience rating (PEMBA) in 1998. Furthermore ﬁrms could
decide to opt out of the public system to bear the risk themselves or to rein-
sure the risk with private insurance companies.
More recent policies during the late 1990s and early 2000s are aimed at
achieving a more efﬁcient administration. This has resulted in the merger of
ﬁve different administrative ofﬁces into one public monopoly which is respon-
sible for the administration of all DI and UI beneﬁts in The Netherlands.
This is not to say, however, that no further reforms will be made. Based on
proposals of the Social and Economic Council of The Netherlands (2002), it
is likely that the DI system will be split into two parts: a public insurance for
the fully and long-lasting disabled and a private insurance for the temporarily
disabled and partially disabled.
2.2 The Current Position of Disability Insurance in The Netherlands
Social security in The Netherlands can be divided into employee insurance
and national insurance. The ﬁrst covers risks related to labour market status,
such as unemployment, sickness and disability, and is mostly earnings-related.
The insured population consists of those who are employed. The second kind
of insurance is meant to provide a minimum income guarantee for all inhab-
itants of The Netherlands. The most obvious examples of national insurance
are welfare and old age state pension.4 Further examples are disability insur-
ance for non-working younger persons (WAJONG), health care insurance
(AWBZ), family allowances (AKW) and surviving relatives’ pension (ANW).
All national insurance programmes are ﬁnanced on a pay-as-you-go basis.
Sickness beneﬁts are paid to employees who are unable to work due to
sickness. In principle, the gross replacement rate equals 70% of the previ-
ously earned (gross) wage, but as a result of collective labour agreements
these sickness beneﬁts are often supplemented up to a replacement rate of
100%. Sickness beneﬁts may last for a maximum of 12months.5 At the end
of this period, one may apply for disability beneﬁts. Disability beneﬁts can
be granted to persons who would face a loss in income of more than 15%
as a result of disability.6 This (estimated) loss in income is often called the
degree of disability, and determines the exact amount of DI beneﬁts that will
4 Note that apart from the old age state pension (AOW), most persons older than 65 years
are entitled to occupational pensions, which are mostly earnings-related.
5 Since 2004, the period with sickness beneﬁts has been extended to 24months.
6 Note the contrast with many other countries (e.g. Germany, Sweden, UK), where the loss
in work capacity is decisive for receiving DI beneﬁts, not the loss in income.
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be received. Both the cause of disability and the employment history are not
relevant for the acceptance decision.
Obviously, DI applicants are for a large part individuals who have simply
become incapable to work. The reason for this incapability is irrelevant, i.e.
no distinction has been made between ‘professional risk’ and ‘social risk’.7
The decision to apply for DI beneﬁts might however also be related to eco-
nomic incentives, and hence act as a substitute for UI, early retirement bene-
ﬁts, and welfare. The frequency of DI enrolment depends on DI programme
characteristics, labour market factors and alternative social security program
opportunities. Several studies have shown that arrangements such as early
retirement, DI, and UI act as a system of substitute pathways. Restricting one
of the social security arrangements will therefore affect the use of the other
arrangements.
Limiting the conditions for early retirement, for example, may hardly
reduce the withdrawal of elderly of the labour market, as they will start using
alternative exit routes instead (viz. DI and UI). DI beneﬁts are often per-
ceived to be more attractive than UI beneﬁts. First, DI does not impose a
job search requirement. Moreover, UI beneﬁts are of limited duration, while
the only temporal aspect of DI entitlement is a periodical re-examination.
Improper use of DI beneﬁts as a more generous, and less stigmatising,8 alter-
native to unemployment beneﬁts was quite common in late 1970s and 1980s.
It provided employers with a ﬂexible instrument to reduce the labour force
at will and kept ofﬁcial unemployment rates low (Aarts and de Jong (1992)).
Several studies for The Netherlands have shown that the share of hidden
unemployment within DI schemes lies between 10 and 50%.9 Research for
the United States shows similar results. Accounting for the role of disability
in inducing labour force exit among the low-skilled unemployed, Autor and
Duggan (2002) estimated that US unemployment rate would be two-thirds of
a percentage point higher were it not for the liberalised DI system.
3 DISABILITY INSURANCE BENEFITS AND INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOUR
Three months before ﬁnishing the period on sickness beneﬁts, an individual
may apply for DI beneﬁts. Subsequently, the Dutch Social Beneﬁts Admin-
istration (UWV10) decides on the application. A medical examiner veriﬁes
and evaluates (physical) limitations and job opportunities, and, based on
this examination, the DI administrator decides whether or not to accept the
7 Note that this is not in accordance with DI in most other western countries, who do make
a distinction between both types of risk.
8 Woittiez et al. (1994) show that, holding other factors constant, early retirement beneﬁts
and DI beneﬁts are the preferred exit routes from the labour market, while UI beneﬁts are
subject to a certain ‘stigma effect’.
9 See the references cited in section 1.
10 There used to exist ﬁve different administration ofﬁces, which merged into UWV in 2000.
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Figure 1 – Game tree for disability application and award processa
a ‘Beneﬁts’ may either be ‘full beneﬁts’ or ‘partial beneﬁts’ (the latter in case of partial disability)
applicant. In case of acceptance, a beneﬁt is awarded for a period of 5 years,
after which a periodical re-examination takes place. The degree of disability
is determined by an expert, who compares the applicant’s current earnings
capacity with his past earnings capacity. A rejected applicant has the oppor-
tunity to appeal. The letter of objection must be sent within the period men-
tioned in the rejection letter. Subsequently, the DI administrator reconsiders
the ﬁrst decision. The application – award – appeal decision is illustrated in
Figure 1. Note that if an applicant is denied beneﬁts at the reconsideration
stage, then he may exercise the option to have his case considered by court.
This is not shown in Figure 1.
Disability Insurance, as well as other employee insurances, suffer from the
problem of moral hazard (see, e.g. Barr (1993)). Imperfect information of the
DI administrator in the award and reconsideration decisions leads to higher
DI enrolment as a result of an adjustment in the behaviour of the insured
population. A second form of moral hazard may be a lack in prevention
efforts. In this respect, the DI application and appeal decisions of an individ-
ual can be regarded as choices between consumption and leisure, given insti-
tutions, health conditions, personal characteristics, working conditions and
the expected probability of being granted DI beneﬁts.11 Obviously, for many
11 Note that the problem of moral hazard equally applies to the employer’s behaviour (Aarts
and de Jong (1992), Koning (2004)). This is however beyond the scope of this paper.
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applicants this labour supply decision will be severely constrained by their
health status. These individuals will show high demand for leisure irrespective
of the ﬁnancial conditions involved. Nonetheless, the moral hazard problem
just described, together with existing empirical evidence (mainly for countries
outside The Netherlands), suggests that factors other than health play a sig-
niﬁcant role in the behaviour of individuals, in particular ﬁnancial incentives
(see section 1). Thus, individuals who are less constrained by their health sta-
tus are likely to be sensitive to ﬁnancial incentives, and raise their demand




As was already mentioned in section 2, the exact DI beneﬁt conditions are
the result of negotiations by employers’ organisations and trade unions. These
negotiations, which mostly take place at the sector or ﬁrm level, are laid down
in collective labour agreements. In the period that will be under consideration,
the negotiated collective labour agreements at the sector level were made com-
pulsory by the government for all ﬁrms in that sector. The resulting variation
in replacement rates over different sectors and ﬁrms is exactly the variation
we will exploit to identify the elasticity of DI enrolment with respect to the
ﬁnancial incentives involved. The pitfalls involved in this approach will be dis-
cussed in later sections.
A database with information on replacement rates for different sectors is
available through The Netherlands’ Labour Inspectorate. We have made a
selection of sectors, such that we were able to match their codes with the sec-
tor codes in our dataset of individuals. This is necessary in order to be able to
connect both datasets and perform an analysis at the micro level (this will be
further discussed in the next subsection). The resulting selection of 39 sectors,
with corresponding replacement rates in the year 2002, is given in Appendix
A (Table 6). The reported ﬁnancial indicators are the replacement rate for
year t (denoted by RRt ), and the DI wealth rate (DIWR). This latter vari-
able is deﬁned as the ratio of the sum of all discounted future DI beneﬁts to
current income. This deﬁnition allows us to conveniently rewrite this indica-










=RR1 +ρRR2 + ρ
2 −ρ65−AGE
1−ρ RR3, (4.1)
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where y0 denotes current income, ρ is a discount factor and RR3 is the
replacement rate in the third year and years ahead (i.e. the replacement rate
remains constant from the third year on). The mandatory retirement age of
65 is the natural maximum in this expression, as DI beneﬁts automatically
stop at this age. The discount factor ρ not only contains the individual’s time
preference but also represents future uncertainty about receiving DI beneﬁts.
For instance, DI recipients who become subject to a medical reassessment
may lose their DI beneﬁts. Second, the introduction of new policy measures
may affect existing DI recipients.
It can be read from Table 6 that the average replacement rate in the ﬁrst
year equals 89% of the last earned wage, while the second and third year
show average replacement rates of 75 and 70%, respectively.12 Thus, the addi-
tional beneﬁts on top of the ‘ofﬁcial replacement rate’ of 70% are especially
high in the ﬁrst year of Disability Insurance. As was noted in section 2.1, the
1993 reform implied that the earnings related beneﬁts became of limited dura-
tion, but that this loss in beneﬁts was ‘repaired’ in most cases. In Table 6 it
becomes clear that nearly all sectors supplement DI beneﬁts from the third
year on to 70% of the last earned wage. Two sectors even have a higher
replacement rate for these years of, respectively, 75% (joinery works) and 80%
(road transport). Most of the variation in replacement rates over different sec-
tors is however in the ﬁrst and second year. The range of replacement rates
in both years is from 70 to 100%. At the average age in our sample (37 years)
and a discount rate of 10%, the average ‘DI wealth’ is seen to equal 6.9 year
salaries, with a minimum of 6.6 year salaries (Six different sectors) and a max-
imum of 7.6 year salaries (road transport).
4.2 Micro Data
The Dutch Income Panel dataset “IPO” is based on administrative data from
Dutch National Tax Ofﬁce and was initiated in 1984.13 Since 1989, the data-
set consists of a panel of about 75,000 individuals, who are randomly drawn
from the Dutch population provided that they were 15 years or older and
enlisted in the Dutch municipal registers. Attrition occurs only as a result of
emigration or death. In that case new individuals are added to the sample to
keep the total number of individuals at the same level. For each individual
drawn into the sample several variables are available, which can be divided
into three groups:
12 On the basis of our dataset with individual records (see next subsection), the average
replacement rates equal 86, 75, and 71 for the ﬁrst, second, and third year, respectively.
13 The acronym IPO stands for “Income Panel Study” (in Dutch: Inkomens Panel
Onderzoek).
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• Variables concerning individual characteristics, such as gender, date of
birth, and a variable indicating the sector in which the individual was
working;
• Variables concerning household characteristics, such as the number of
persons in the household, the number of minor children (age categories)
and marital status;
• Financial variables, such as the level of the income, and the source of
the income (e.g. wage income, pension beneﬁt, DI beneﬁt, UI beneﬁt).
The observation of these variables is in principle on a yearly basis, and
relates both to household and individual income. Also, some other ﬁnan-
cial variables are available, such as outstanding mortgage and real estate
appraisal (the so-called “WOZ-value”).
The IPO dataset not only contains information on the individuals selected
into the sample, but also on the other persons in the households they belong
to. These last individuals will also be included in our sample. A great advan-
tage of this administrative dataset is that the observed variables are measured
with high accuracy. A drawback of the IPO dataset is however that it lacks
some crucial variables which are not related to the household and ﬁnancial
situation of individuals, most notably education and health status. A second
drawback is that we are not able to distinguish whether an individual is par-
tially or fully disabled; we can only observe whether an individual receives DI
beneﬁts.
For our empirical analysis we use data from the period 1996–2000. We
select those individuals into our sample who are eligible for receiving DI ben-
eﬁts in case of disability. That is, all individuals with positive wage income
on December 31 of the years 1995–1999 are selected into our sample. These
are precisely the individuals who might enter DI in the subsequent years.
Thus, according to our deﬁnition, an individual enters the DI scheme when
he receives wage income at the beginning of the year (formally, on the last
day of the previous year) and receives a DI beneﬁt at some other moment
of the year. Note that, as a result of this selection process, the self-employed
are also removed from our sample. This is correct, as the self-employed have
their own DI, which is different from the DI for employees considered in this
article. The resulting gross sample contains 520,887 records based on 158,876
individuals (on average 3.3 yearly observations per individual).
In order to assess the effect of ﬁnancial incentives on the probability of
entering the DI scheme, the replacement rates of Dutch Labour Inspector-
ate are linked to the individuals in our gross sample. An overview of replace-
ment rates of sectors was given in Table 6, and since no substantial changes
in replacement rates have occurred in the period 1996–2002,14 we have linked
14 We have veriﬁed this claim with an alternative dataset called the ‘FNV CAO Databank’,
and indeed found that all replacement rates remained constant over the period concerned.
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TABLE 1 – SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS IPO, 1996–2000
Gross sample Net sample
In sample DI enrolment In sample DI enrolment
(% of sample (% of concerning (% of sample (% of concerning
size) category) size) category)
Total 100.0 0.39 100.0 0.46
Woman 40.4 0.51 26.1 0.52
Man 59.6 0.31 73.9 0.44
Age, 29 29.0 0.19 28.6 0.16
Age, 30–34 13.6 0.37 13.3 0.42
Age, 35–39 15.1 0.38 14.8 0.43
Age, 40–44 14.1 0.45 14.1 0.56
Age, 45–49 12.2 0.47 12.9 0.60
Age, 50–54 9.1 0.64 10.2 0.73
Age, 55–59 4.5 0.89 5.0 1.12
Age, above 60 2.1 0.42 1.2 0.62
Couple 72.2 0.44 73.5 0.54
Single 27.8 0.27 26.5 0.23
With children 55.1 0.36 53.3 0.39
No children 44.9 0.43 46.7 0.54
Manufacturing sector 5.5 0.35 26.9 0.38
Construction sector 5.4 0.53 26.3 0.59
Trade and Food sector 7.3 0.34 33.6 0.39
Transport and Storage
sector 2.7 0.51 13.3 0.50
Other sector or sector
unknown 79.1 0.38 – –
these ﬁgures to the individuals in the IPO dataset for the period 1996–2000.
This is possible because we observe the sector an individual works in. The
resulting dataset contains 97,950 records from 34,404 individuals (on average
2.8 yearly observations per individual).
In total, 448 of the 97,950 observations enter the DI scheme (0.46%; see
Table 1). This is a little higher than the enrolment rate observed in the gross
sample (0.39%), but this difference can be attributed to the selection of sec-
tors. It should however be noted that the actual macro ﬁgures concerning DI
inﬂow are higher: over the period concerned the average macro DI enrolment
ﬁgure was 1.2% [Lisv (various years)]. A possible reason for this is that not
all entrants in DI are observed as such. In section 5 we will further address
this point.
The sample characteristics of our net sample are well in line with those
of the gross sample. Only the proportion between males and females dif-
fers in both samples, but this is (again) a straightforward consequence of the
selection of particular sectors. It can be read from Table 1 that 26% of the
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individuals in the dataset consist of women, of which 0.52% enter the DI
scheme during the period 1996–2000. Older individuals show a higher DI en-
rolment during this period than younger individuals. The household charac-
teristics indicate that couples have a higher DI enrolment than singles, and
that households with children have a lower DI enrolment than households
without children. The construction sector shows a higher DI enrolment per-
centage than other sectors.
5 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
As was discussed in section 3, DI program participation results from two con-
tingencies: the probability that a worker claims to be disabled and applies for
DI beneﬁts, and the probability that the claim will be awarded by the pro-
gramme administrator. In most previous research the typical approach was
to estimate a single reduced form model of the ﬁnal allowance decision. The
main reason for this is the lack of data needed to identify the parameters
which govern the separate stages of the process. Our analysis will be no excep-
tion to this line of research. In contrast, a number of studies were able to esti-
mate a multistage model describing the various stages of the application and
award decision (e.g. Lahiri et al. (1995), Riphahn and Kreider (1998), Benitez-
Silva et al. (1999)).
In the previous section it appeared that the observed DI inﬂow prob-
abilities in the IPO sample are substantially lower than the macro ﬁgures
published by Lisv (various years). This could be the result of incomplete
observation of DI enrolment, since the administrations of the National Tax
Ofﬁce and the DI Administration Ofﬁce are separate. As appeared from
Table 1, this is not so much the result of our sample selection procedure,
but rather a (possible) characteristic of the dataset used. In this section we
discuss a strategy which is robust to misclassiﬁcation of the dependent vari-
able, provided that the underlying process is correctly speciﬁed by the Logit
model. Furthermore, we specify the log-likelihood for our sample subject to
the bounded Logit model, and brieﬂy discuss a speciﬁcation test we will use.
The latter is extremely important in this case, as our solution to the incom-
plete observation problem hinges on the Logit speciﬁcation.
Deﬁne Y as the variable indicating whether DI enrolment takes place
(Y =1) or not (Y = 0), and suppose that this event can be modelled through
the well-known Logit model:
p1 =Pr{Y =1}= exp(x
′β)
1+ exp(x′β) , (5.1)
where the vector x contains a range of explanatory variables. Furthermore,
suppose that a fraction of the observations with Y =0 is incorrectly observed,
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that is π =Pr{Y = 0|Z = 1} is greater than zero.15 Here the observed binary
variable is denoted by Y , while the true score is denoted by Z. In our case,
this means that some observations are not coded as DI entrants, while they
should be. Now if we assume that p1 is Logit then the probability of observ-
ing DI enrolment equals
q1 =Pr{Y =1}=1−Pr{Y =0|Z =1}p1 −Pr{Y =0|Z =0}(1−p1)
=p1(1−π), (5.2)
so that the probability of observing Y =1 equals
q1 = (1−π) exp(x
′β)
1+ exp(x′β) . (5.3)
Note that it is assumed here that Pr{Y = 0|Z = 0}= 1,i.e. if no DI enrolment
takes place then this is always correctly indicated in our data. This model
is identical to the so-called ‘bounded Logit model’ (see, e.g. Cramer (2004)).




{yi ln q1(xi, β,π)+ (1−yi) ln(1−q1(xi, β,π))}, (5.4)
where individual-year observations are indexed by i, the total number of
observations in the sample is n, and yi indicates DI enrolment for observa-
tion i. It is assumed that individual heterogeneity can be captured by the
variables in xi , i.e. we estimate the pooled model. An important argument
in favour of pooled estimation is that both the elasticity and the marginal
effect of q1 with respect to variables in x (in particular DIWR) are less sen-
sitive for the neglect of unobserved heterogeneity than the parameters in β
themselves.16 This was recently conﬁrmed in a Monte Carlo study by Cramer
(2005), who hardly ﬁnds any bias in the estimated marginal effects. Another
recent Monte Carlo study by Greene (2004) ﬁnds that the pooled estimator
performs better if the number of observations per individual is small, while
the ﬁxed effects estimator (full estimation) does relatively better if the number
15 See Hausman et al. (1998) for a more general treatment of the topic.
16 According to Greene (2004) this is particularly the case for continuous covariates. Of
course, it should be mentioned that Conditional Logit estimation (CLE) has some theoretical
advantages over pooled estimation, but there are two important practical problems with CLE.
First, no ‘average partial effects’ or elasticities can be computed, as the ﬁxed effects distribu-
tion remains unknown, and second, the model is only identiﬁed from the ‘within’ dimension
of the data, which in our case means that only the individuals entering DI contribute to the
likelihood, while others (99,5% of our data) are discarded.
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of observations per individual increases.17 For our case, this is another argu-
ment in favour of the pooled model, as the number of observations per indi-
vidual is at most 5 (and on average less than 3; see section 4.2).
In the preceding discussion it has become clear that the assumption of the
Logit speciﬁcation is crucial for our analysis. It is therefore necessary to test
this assumption. For instance, we can test whether the predicted fraction with
Y =1 in the sample is consistent with the shape of the bounded Logit curve.
Suppose that the observations are ordered into G different groups by their






for all g = 2, . . . , G, and I (g) is the set of individuals in group g. Denote
with ng the number of observations in group g, with fg the fraction of obser-
vations in this group with Y =1, and with q1(g) the average predicted proba-
bility of Y =1 for this group. Under the null hypothesis that the observations









has a chi-square distribution with G-2 degrees of freedom (Hosmer and
Lemeshow (1980, 2000)). When small probabilities are involved, Cramer
(2003, 2004) advocates the use of groups with equal numbers of observations.
The point is that if the composition of the groups is based on percentiles of
q1, then the sample population will be extremely unevenly distributed across
different groups, so that the test loses much of its power. As our case typically
involves small probabilities (of DI enrolment) we will apply Cramer’s version
of the Hosmer–Lemeshow test.
6 ESTIMATION RESULTS
Estimation results for two different speciﬁcations are shown in Table 2. Panel
(1) shows results for the bounded Logit model with the replacement rates in
the two ﬁrst years as explanatory variables, and panel (2) uses the DI Wealth
Rate incentive measure discussed in section 4.1. Both speciﬁcations include
the lagged DI enrolment per sector and dummy variables for each (broadly
17 For this matter, the author has presented results for the Probit model, but these are likely
to carry over to the Logit model. Note that the third possibility, random effects estimation,
is unattractive, because this involves the rarely satisﬁed assumption that random effects are
uncorrelated with the covariates in x. Greene (2004) indeed ﬁnds that random effects estima-
tion is inferior to both pooled and ﬁxed effects estimation.
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deﬁned) sector, in an attempt to correct for sector-speciﬁc effects. Lagged DI
enrolment is determined over the same sectors as the DI Wealth Rate, but it
can be identiﬁed separately from the latter as it varies more over different sec-
tors.18 This variable is likely to be a good ﬁrst predictor for the individual
enrolment probability, and indeed the concerning estimates are close to unity.
Furthermore, the signiﬁcantly positive dummy variable for the Construction
sector suggests that, after controlling for individual, household and ﬁnancial
variables, the individual risk of DI enrolment is higher in that sector than in
other sectors. This seems plausible, as the work in this sector is in general
physically more demanding.
Coefﬁcients on the replacement rates and the DI Wealth Rate show the
correct (positive) sign, although the former are surrounded by rather wide
conﬁdence intervals. As was apparent in equation (4.1), the DI Wealth Rate
nonlinearly depends on the discount factor ρ. It turned out to be difﬁcult
numerically to ﬁnd the optimal value for this parameter, so that we have
repeatedly estimated both models for ﬁxed values of ρ and ﬁnally reported
those estimates for which the Likelihood attained its maximum value. The
optimal value for ρ was 0.79, implying an individual discount rate of 21%.
This may appear high, but as was noted in section 4.1 DI recipients face sev-
eral forms of risk with respect to their future DI beneﬁts (e.g. medical reas-
sessments), which justiﬁes an additional ‘risk premium’. It is however noted
that the estimation results are rather insensitive for (local) variations in ρ. In
speciﬁcation (2) the point estimate for the DI Wealth Rate parameter equals
0.72, which translates into a marginal effect of 3.30 · 10−3 or an elasticity of
DI enrolment with respect to the DI Wealth Rate of 2.5 (see Table 3). In
this last table it can also be read that the model speciﬁcation (2) predicts
that a constant replacement rate of 75% implies a 17% higher incidence of
DI enrolment than a constant replacement rate of 70%. It is expected a pri-
ori that the marginal effect with respect to the DI Wealth Rate is compara-
ble to that with respect to the replacement rate in the ﬁrst year, and indeed
this turns out to be the case [see panel (1) in Table 3]. One would however
expect that the effect with respect to the replacement rate in the second year
is smaller than that in the ﬁrst year as a result of individual time preference.
This is not what our point estimates indicate, but we cannot draw any strong
conclusions on the discount rate on the basis of these estimations because
of the wideness of conﬁdence intervals. Further simulations show that rais-
ing replacement rates in the ﬁrst and second year by 5%-points leads to an
increase in DI enrolment by 6%. Again, both speciﬁcations show very similar
effects.
Returning to Table 2, the other parameter values mostly show their
expected signs. The risk of DI enrolment tends to become higher for higher
18 In fact, the correlation between both variables (over the sample of individuals) amounts
no more than 0.11.
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TABLE 2 – ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR BOUNDED LOGIT MODEL WITH DI EN-




Constant −7.20∗∗ (0.68) −8.90∗∗ (1.18)
Financial variables
DI Wealth Rate − 0.72∗∗ (0.31)
Replacement rate year 1 0.61 (0.49) −
Replacement rate year 2 0.67 (0.77) −
Lagged Income −0.09∗∗ (0.03) −0.09∗∗ (0.03)
Lagged DI enrolment in sectora 1.15∗∗ (0.21) 1.11∗∗ (0.20)
Age categoryb
30–34 1.23∗∗ (0.26) 1.23∗∗ (0.25)
35–39 1.29∗∗ (0.27) 1.30∗∗ (0.26)
40–44 1.39∗∗ (0.26) 1.41∗∗ (0.25)
45–49 1.30∗∗ (0.26) 1.34∗∗ (0.25)
50–54 1.49∗∗ (0.26) 1.61∗∗ (0.26)
55–59 1.94∗∗ (0.28) 2.30∗∗ (0.31)
60–64 1.38∗∗ (0.49) 2.51∗∗ (0.63)
Household situationb
Female/single −0.53 (0.39) −0.52 (0.38)
Female/with partner 0.40∗ (0.24) 0.41∗ (0.23)
Male/with partner 0.16 (0.22) 0.16 (0.22)
Children in householdb
Younger than 6 years −0.74∗∗ (0.20) −0.75∗∗ (0.20)
6–12 years −0.37∗∗ (0.19) −0.37∗∗ (0.18)
12 years or older −0.14 (0.16) −0.14 (0.16)
Sectorb
Manufacturing −0.21 (0.19) −0.10 (0.18)
Construction 0.42∗∗ (0.18) 0.54∗∗ (0.19)
Trade and food −0.08 (0.19) 0.04 (0.18)
Yearb
1997 −0.31∗∗ (0.16) −0.31∗∗ (0.15)
1998 −0.34∗∗ (0.16) −0.34∗∗ (0.15)
1999 −0.72∗∗ (0.18) −0.72∗∗ (0.17)
2000 −0.59∗∗ (0.17) −0.59∗∗ (0.16)
Bound 0.76∗∗ (0.07) 0.82∗∗ (0.09)
Discount rate − 0.21 –
* Signiﬁcantly different from zero at 10% conﬁdence level (asymptotic t-test).
** Signiﬁcantly different from zero at 5% conﬁdence level (asymptotic t-test). For the variable
‘Bound’ the relevant hypothesis is whether it is equal to one. As can be seen, the asymptotic
t-test rejects this hypothesis in both model speciﬁcations.
a This variable is deﬁned as the average DI enrolment over the period 1993–1995 for the sector
the individual is working in, and is computed on the basis of our sample.
b The reference categories for these dummy variables are: ‘younger than 30 years of age’,
‘male/single’, ‘no children’, ‘Transport and Storage’ and ‘1996’, respectively.
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TABLE 3 – IMPLIED EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
(1) (2)
Marginal effectsa
w.r.t. DI wealth rate – 0.0033 (0.0014)
w.r.t. replacement rate year 1 0.0028 (0.0022) –
w.r.t. replacement rate year 2 0.0031 (0.0035) –
Implied elasticitiesa
w.r.t. DI wealth rate – 2.50** (1.14)
w.r.t. replacement rate year 1 0.53 (0.43) –
w.r.t. replacement rate year 2 0.50 (0.58) –
Implied effect on DI enrolment in %-points
RR1 and RR2 are raised from 70 to 75% (RR3=70%) 0.03 (=6%) 0.03 (=6%)
RR1 and RR2 are raised from 70 to 90% (RR3=70%) 0.12 (=25%) 0.12 (=26%)
RR1, RR2 and RR3 are raised from 70 to 75% – 0.08 (=17%)
RR1, RR2 and RR3 are raised from 70 to 90% – 0.32 (=69%)
a Asymptotic standard errors have been computed with the Delta method, and are reported
between parentheses.
ages. Note however that in speciﬁcation (1) the coefﬁcient for the age category
60–64 is smaller than that for ages 50–59, while in speciﬁcation (2) we observe
a monotonic age pattern. A probable reason is that the second speciﬁcation
takes the relatively short time horizon faced by the elderly into account, com-
pare equation (4.1). For women, it is seen that living together with a partner
increases the risk of DI enrolment, while for men there does not appear to
be a strong effect. On the other hand, having young children appears to have
a negative impact on the propensity to DI enrolment. There is no obvious
explanation for this. Perhaps parents have a larger incentive to earn sufﬁcient
income in order to satisfy the needs of their children.
As was discussed in section 5, the Hosmer–Lemeshow test is in fact a
speciﬁcation test for the (bounded) Logit model, so that this test gives us
some indication whether our empirical strategy discussed in section 5 is valid.
Results of the Hosmer–Lemeshow test for speciﬁcation (2) are shown in
Table 4 and Figure 2, with group sizes equalling 9,794 or 9,795 (i.e. each
group contains 10% of our sample). The resulting test statistic equals 10.9,
which is lower than the 5% critical value in the chi-square distribution of
15.5. Thus, the bounded Logit model cannot be rejected. The last two col-
umns in Table 4, and Figure 2, indeed show that the ‘curvature’ of the pre-
dicted probabilities does not deviate too much from the postulated curvature
of the bounded Logit model. Note that on the basis of this statistical test the
alternative model speciﬁcation (1) can also not be rejected, with a test statistic
equalling 12.6.
In Table 5 estimation results for some interesting parameters in alterna-
tive speciﬁcations are reported. Speciﬁcation (3) includes interaction effects
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9794 0.00 0.10 0.09 0.07
9795 0.10 0.15 0.09 0.12
9795 0.15 0.21 0.13 0.18
9795 0.21 0.27 0.27 0.24
9795 0.27 0.34 0.38 0.30
9795 0.34 0.43 0.33 0.39
9795 0.43 0.55 0.40 0.49
9795 0.55 0.70 0.59 0.62
9795 0.70 0.95 0.97 0.81



















































Figure 2 – Fit of the predicted probabilities for ten equally sized groups in the bounded Logit
model
between age and time in order to investigate whether there is a shift in the
age pattern over time. As was discussed in section 2, some policy measures
taken during early 1990s were aimed at reducing the inﬂow into DI. While
these effects may for an important part be captured by the year dummy vari-
ables, it is well possible that effects differ between different age groups. It
can however be read from the estimated coefﬁcients and standard errors that
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there is no evidence for this. A test of the null hypothesis that coefﬁcients
for those aged 50 in years 1998, 1999 or 2000 are jointly equal to zero can-
not be rejected (the concerning F -statistic equals 0.35, with a critical value
of 2.60 at the 5% conﬁdence level), i.e. there is no proof that the risk of
DI enrolment has decreased for the elderly during these 3 years. As speciﬁ-
cation (2) is nested in speciﬁcation (3) we can also perform a likelihood ratio
test. The resulting chi-square statistic with four degrees of freedom equals 6.2,
so that we cannot reject the restricted version of the model at any conven-
tional signiﬁcance level. The pattern of the year effects in all speciﬁcations
(1)–(5) nonetheless suggests that the general risk on DI enrolment has struc-
turally decreased over the years, which may be the result of policy measures
taken during early 1990s. Note that the parameter estimates not reported in
Table 5 remain qualitatively the same as those in speciﬁcations (1) and (2) (see
Table 2).
Speciﬁcation (4) in Table 5 includes the replacement rate in the third year
as an explanatory variable. Compared to speciﬁcation (1) without this vari-
able, it becomes clear that the likelihood is hardly increased. The point esti-
mate for the coefﬁcient RR3 is large, which is in accordance with equation
(4.1). This estimate is however based on very limited variation in this vari-
able (see Table 6), which results in a high-standard error. An interesting point
is that the likelihood in speciﬁcation (4) remains lower than that with DIWR
as an explanatory variable, while the latter preserves more degrees of freedom.
Apparently, the model ﬁt is greatly improved by including an interaction term
ρ63−AGE ·RR3 – even if the parameters are constrained beforehand.19 Thus,
taking into account that the elderly face a shorter time horizon than youn-
ger individuals improves the model. Also, it is noted (again) that the pattern
of age dummy variables is monotonic in the speciﬁcations with DIWR, while
in other speciﬁcations it is not. In conclusion, we observe that (i) speciﬁca-
tions (3) and (4) do not (statistically) improve upon speciﬁcations (2) and (1),
respectively, and that (ii) the speciﬁcation with DIWR as an explanatory var-
iable has a higher likelihood than other speciﬁcations while preserving more
degrees of freedom.20 From these comparisons we may conclude that the
model speciﬁcation (2) is to be preferred over speciﬁcations (1), (3) and (4).
Finally, in order to check the robustness of our ﬁndings, we estimate a
speciﬁcation where replacement rates of the ﬁrst and second year are clus-
tered in categories ranging from 70 to 80% (base case), 80 to 90% and 90 to
100% (speciﬁcation (5) in Table 5). It can be seen that all coefﬁcients show
the correct sign, and that some estimates are signiﬁcantly different from zero
at a 10% conﬁdence level. The implied effects are somewhat lower than those
19 Note that βDIWR = βRR1 + γ1RR2 + γ2RR3 + γ3ρ63−AGERR3, where all γi are (con-
strained to be) functions of β and ρ (compare equation (4.1)).
20 It is however not possible to perform a formal (Likelihood Ratio) test here, as speciﬁcation
(2) is not nested in the other speciﬁcations (or vice versa).
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TABLE 5 – ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR SOME ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS,
ASYMPTOTIC STANDARD ERRORS BETWEEN PARENTHESES, n=97950
(3) (4) (5)
Log-Likelihood −2714.89 −2719.56 −2716.10
Financial variables
DI Wealth Rate 0.71∗∗ (0.32) − −
Replacement rate year 1 − 0.67 (0.56) −
Replacement rate year 2 − 0.64 (0.86) −
Replacement rate year 3 − 2.12 (3.44) −
RR1 between 90 and 100% − − 0.22 (0.17)
RR1 between 80 and 90% − − 0.45∗ (0.24)
RR2 between 90 and 100% − − 0.40∗ (0.21)
RR2 between 80 and 90% − − 0.15 (0.15)
Age category
30-34 1.23∗∗ (0.26) 1.23∗∗ (0.29) 1.23∗∗ (0.28)
35-39 1.30∗∗ (0.26) 1.30∗∗ (0.30) 1.30∗∗ (0.28)
40-44 1.41∗∗ (0.26) 1.39∗∗ (0.29) 1.39∗∗ (0.27)
45-49 1.34∗∗ (0.26) 1.30∗∗ (0.29) 1.30∗∗ (0.27)
50-54 1.62∗∗ (0.33) 1.50∗∗ (0.29) 1.51∗∗ (0.28)
55-59 2.30∗∗ (0.37) 1.95∗∗ (0.31) 1.95∗∗ (0.29)
60-64 2.51∗∗ (0.68) 1.39∗∗ (0.55) 1.39∗∗ (0.51)
Year
1997 −0.45∗∗ (0.20) −0.31∗ (0.18) −0.31∗ (0.17)
1998 −0.31∗ (0.19) −0.35∗ (0.18) −0.34∗∗ (0.17)
1999 −0.61∗∗ (0.21) −0.73∗∗ (0.20) −0.73∗∗ (0.19)
2000 −0.56∗∗ (0.20) −0.60∗∗ (0.19) −0.60∗∗ (0.17)
Interaction terms
Aged over 50 in 1997 0.43 (0.34) − −
Aged over 50 in 1998 −0.11 (0.35) − −
Aged over 50 in 1999 −0.42 (0.41) − −
Aged over 50 in 2000 −0.10 (0.36) − −
Bound 0.77∗∗ (0.08) 0.61∗∗ (0.05) 0.70∗∗ (0.06)
Discount rate 0.21 - − −
* Signiﬁcantly different from zero at 10% conﬁdence level (asymptotic t-test).
** Signiﬁcantly different from zero at 5% conﬁdence level (asymptotic t-test). For the variable
‘Bound’ the relevant hypothesis is whether it is equal to one. As can be seen, the asymptotic
t-test rejects this hypothesis in both model speciﬁcations.
a Note that not all estimated coefﬁcients are reported in the table. Full results are available upon
request.
reported in Table 3: an increase in the replacement rate in the ﬁrst and second
year with 20%-points (10%-points) leads to an increase of DI enrolment with
0.07%-points (0.03%-points). This is about one third lower than the estimated
effects from speciﬁcations (1) and (2) reported in Table 3. Finally, we have
also estimated a Logit version of the model with DIWR as an explanatory
variable (i.e. ﬁxed the bound parameter at unity), and experimented with
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different discount rates. In these estimations the elasticities with respect to the
DI Wealth Rate appeared quite robust, sometimes implying somewhat higher
elasticity estimates, but lower likelihoods.21
7 CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
In this article, we have estimated the impact of the ﬁnancial conditions in DI
on the individual’s probability of DI enrolment. We have found that individ-
uals with relatively high DI Wealth (that is, the ratio of foreseen DI beneﬁts
to current income) are more likely to enrol. Based on variation in DI replace-
ment rates between different sectors, we estimate that a 5%-point increase in
the replacement rates in the ﬁrst and second year of disability raises DI en-
rolment by 6%, while a general 5%-point increase in the replacement rate
increases DI enrolment by 17%. It is however noted that the latter estimate
is surrounded by more uncertainty, as the effect of the replacement rate from
the third year could not be estimated with high precision. The elasticity of
DI enrolment with respect to the DI Wealth Rate was estimated at a value of
2.5. In estimating these ﬁgures, we have controlled for individual and house-
hold speciﬁc characteristics, and have tried to correct for sector speciﬁc effects
(other than ﬁnancial conditions) and the possibility of incomplete observation
of DI enrolment.
Recently, the Dutch government has decided to reform DI largely along
the lines proposed by the Social and Economic Council of The Netherlands
(2002). This reform entails, amongst others, an increase of the DI replacement
rate with 5%-points and the abolishment of experience rating in DI employer
premiums.22 Both these measures are expected to lead to an increase in the
DI enrolment rate. It appears from our analysis that a general 5%-point
increase in the replacement rate increases DI enrolment by 17%, while Koning
(2004) has shown that the existing experience rating system has reduced DI
inﬂow by about the same percentage. Of course, these ﬁgures cannot be added
up right away because of overlap, but it is clear that the effect of this part of
the proposal may be substantial and possibly harm the government’s objec-
tive to reduce moral hazard in the Dutch DI scheme. It is however worth of
mention that the newly devised DI schedule involves multiple features to com-
bat moral hazard (e.g. stricter eligibility criteria) which in turn may result in
other adverse ﬁnancial incentive effects than would be the case in the ‘old’ DI
scheme. It is well possible that adverse incentive effects under the new scheme
will be of lower magnitude than the ﬁgures just mentioned.
21 Results are available in van Vuren and van Vuuren (2005).
22 Although both these changes are conditional on DI enrolment and the level of supple-
mentary beneﬁts in sickness insurance, it is believed that the likelihood that they will actually
take place is large.
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A possible complication with the current empirical analysis is that DI
replacement rates may in the long run depend on the risk of DI enrolment.
That is, labour unions have a stronger incentive to negotiate high-replace-
ment rates if the risk of DI enrolment is higher. If this is really the case,
then the effects reported in this study may overestimate the true effect. Tak-
ing account of such a mechanism will however prove difﬁcult, as no appro-
priate instruments appear to be available.23 A second point which is left for
future research is that the current elasticity has been estimated at given eligi-
bility criteria. As was just mentioned above, it is however likely that the elas-
ticity depends (negatively) on eligibility strictness, so that the evaluation of
policy measures including a modiﬁcation in eligibility criteria would require
more precise knowledge of this interdependence.
APPENDIX A. REPLACEMENT RATES PER SECTOR




Categoryb Name RR1 RR2 RR3 DIWRc
158 1 Manufacture of bread, fresh
pastry goods and cakes
85 85 70 692
170 1 Manufacture of textiles 100 70 70 693
182 1 Manufacture of wearing
apparel and accessories (excl.
leather)
100 70 70 693
203 1 Manufacture of builders’
carpentry and joinery
80 75 75 716
212 1 Manufacture of articles of
paper and paperboard
100 100 70 720
222 1 Printing and service activities
related to printing
100 100 70 720
23 That is, variables inﬂuencing the replacement rate, but not DI enrolment. A possibility is
to estimate a simultaneous model for DI enrolment and the DI replacement rates, but this
would require data over a longer time period. The problem with such a long time period is
data inconsistency; e.g. the deﬁnitions of sectors have changed (in 1993), and the composi-
tion of sectors has also changed over the years. It should however be noted that replacement
rates for the sectors selected in this paper remained constant over time (see section 4), so that
‘changes’ in replacement rates are with certainty exogenous with respect to DI enrolment dur-
ing the period of our study.
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TABLE 6 – CONTINUED
Sector
Code a
Categoryb Name RR1 RR2 RR3 DIWRc
266 1 Manufacture of articles of
concrete, plaster or cement
100 70 70 693
270 1 Manufacture of basic metals
(excl. iron, steel, and
ferro-alloys)
94 70 70 687
271 1 Manufacture of basic iron and
steel and of ferro-alloys
70 70 70 663
280 1 Manufacture of fabricated
metal products, except machin-
ery and equipment
100 70 70 693
342 1 Manufacture of bodies (coach-
work) for motor vehicles;
manufacture of trailers and
semi-trailers
100 70 70 693
361 1 Manufacture of furniture 80 70 70 673
400 1 Electricity, gas, steam and hot
water supply
90 70 70 683
452 2 Building of complete construc-
tions or parts thereof; civil
engineering
70 70 70 663
453 2 Building installation 100 70 70 693
454 2 Building completion 70 70 70 663
501 3 Sale of motor vehicles 100 70 70 693
513 3 Wholesale of food, beverages
and tobacco (excl. meat and
meat products)
90 80 70 692
513 3 Wholesale of meat and meat
products
100 70 70 693
514 3 Wholesale of textiles 100 70 70 693
514 3 Wholesale of electrical house-
hold appliances and radio and
television goods
100 70 70 693
521 3 Retail sale in non-specialised
stores (excl. stores with food,
beverages or tobacco predom-
inating)
90 80 70 692
522 3 Retail sale of meat and meat
products
90 70 70 683
523 3 Dispensing chemists 81.25 70 70 675
523 3 Retail sale of medical and
orthopaedic goods
90 80 70 692
524 3 Retail sale of hardware, paints,
glass, books, newspapers and
stationery
70 70 70 663
524 3 Retail sale of household appli-
ances and radio and television
goods
70 70 70 663
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TABLE 6 – CONTINUED
Sector
Code a
Categoryb Name RR1 RR2 RR3 DIWRc
524 3 Retail sale of clothing 70 70 70 663
524 3 Retail sale of footwear and
leather goods
70 70 70 663
524 3 Retail sale of textiles 90 70 70 683
524 3 Retail sale of furniture, lighting
equipment and household arti-
cles
80 75 70 678
550 3 Hotels and restaurants 100 90 70 711
552 3 Camping sites and other provi-
sion of short-stay accommoda-
tion
100 90 70 711
555 3 Canteens and catering 100 90 70 711
601 4 Transport via railways 90 80 70 692
602 4 Freight transport by road 80 80 80 758
602 4 Scheduled passenger land trans-
port (excl. railways)
95 85 70 702
602 4 Taxi operation 80 70 70 673
640 4 Post and courier activities 85 70 70 678
Sample mean 89 75 70 690
Standard deviation 11 8.7 1.8 20
Source: Labour Inspectorate, own calculations.
a Sector codes are according to the so-called ‘SBI 1993’ deﬁnition. Note, that we have only
reported the 3-digit codes here, while some sectors are actually deﬁned on the basis of 4-digit
codes.
b Sectors are divided into the following categories: 1 = Manufacturing, 2 =Construction,
3 =Trade and food, 4=Transport and storage.
c The DI wealth rate (as a percentage of current income) reported in this column is calculated
at a discount rate of 10 percent (ρ = 0.9) and for the average age in our sample (37 years).
Replacement rates for year t are denoted by RRt . The replacement rate for the third year
remains constant for later years, i.e.: RR3=RR4=RR5= . . .
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